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This report outlines the WRC’s findings and recommendations with respect to alleged 
violations of worker rights at Gildan Activewar El Progreso S.A. (also referred to in this 
report as “Gildan Activewear El Progreso” or “Gildan El Progreso), a sewing facility 
fully owned and operated by Gildan Activewear (also referred to in this report as 
“Gildan”), a Canadian corporation that manufactures t-shirts, tank tops, golf shirts and 
other apparel.  Gildan Activewear owns and operates factories in several countries in 
Central America and the Caribbean.  The plant in question is located in the ZIP Porvenir 
industrial park on the outskirts of El Progreso, Honduras – a small town in Honduras' 
northeastern department of Yoro.  Gildan Activewear El Progreso employs 
approximately 1,800 workers. 
  
According to factory disclosure data supplied to the WRC by affiliate universities, shirts 
are assembled by Gildan El Progreso for the university licensees Jones and Mitchell, MV 
Sport, Ouray Sportswear, USA Player Sportswear Inc., and Bobby Edwards 
Enterprises.  There are a significant number of additional licensees that report Gildan 
Activewear's Montreal headquarters as the source of their Gildan apparel.  These 
licensees are also likely receiving product from Gildan Activewear El Progreso.  These 
include Sports2School, 4004 Incorporated, New Agenda, Monogramming Specialties, 
Royal T Promotions, Perrin Souvenir, B&B Graphics, Continental Silk Screening, and 
Blue Dolphin.  There may be additional collegiate licensees buying Gildan product 
indirectly through intermediaries without listing Gildan as a supplier.  Overall, factory 
disclosure data and other information sources indicate that Gildan is one of the largest 
suppliers of blank t-shirts and other blank apparel to companies selling university logo 
merchandise. 
  
In January 2004, the WRC received a complaint from the Maquila Solidarity Network (a 
Canadian non-governmental organization) supported by the Federación Independiente de 
Trabajadores Hondureños (FITH, Independent Federation of Honduran Workers) and 
Canadian Labour Congress, on behalf of a group of workers alleging labor rights 
violations at Gildan Activewear El Progreso.  The complaint alleged the following 
violations: 
  
• WAGES AND HOURS OF WORK: That mandatory work shifts are longer than 
the legal maximum and that overtime and work on rest days and holidays is not 
compensated in accordance with the law. 
 
• FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION: That a large number of workers have been 
illegally dismissed over the last two years as a result of a plant policy to eliminate 
all trade union activity at the factory and that at least one pregnant worker, who is 
also a trade unionist, has been fired despite legislation to protect pregnant women 
in the workplace.  In addition, that workers who have been illegally fired have 
been harassed in their homes, post-dismissal, by Gildan staff and pressured to sign 
“voluntary” resignation letters.     
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• HARASSMENT AND ABUSE: That workers are verbally harassed by Gildan 
staff. 
  
Initial research by WRC staff, and an analysis of Honduran labor legislation, indicated 
that there was sufficient evidence in support of these allegations to warrant an assessment 
by the WRC and also indicated possible worker rights violations at the factory in the area 
of women’s rights and sexual abuse.  Gildan Activewear was only minimally cooperative 
with the WRC’s factory assessment and refused to allow the WRC Assessment Team 
access to its El Progreso facility.  The Assessment Team did meet with the Country 
Director for Gildan Activewear in Honduras (this individual is no longer employed by the 
company) and with various executives from Gildan’s Canadian headquarters.  The WRC 
conducted extensive interviews and evidence gathering in Honduras during January and 
February and substantial follow up research in the ensuing two months.  
 
Gildan Activewear joined the Fair Labor Association (FLA) in the fall of 2003, becoming 
the first supplier (as opposed to licensee) to do so.  The FLA, also in response to a 
complaint, carried out its own audit of Gildan Activewear El Progreso.  The FLA 
requested and received some assistance from the WRC with respect to worker interviews.  
Since both organizations concluded that remedial action was necessary, the WRC 
proposed joint remediation discussions with Gildan, a proposal to which Gildan and the 
FLA were amenable.  The WRC and the FLA met jointly with Gildan executives in May 
2004 to discuss remediation.  At this meeting, Gildan expressed its intention to take 
meaningful action to resolve the issues at the factory and in-depth discussions of 
unresolved issues continued by e-mail and conference call during the following weeks.   
The two monitoring organizations scheduled a meeting with Gildan for July 12.  Gildan 
indicated that it hoped to reach final agreement on a remediation plan at this meeting, 
though in discussions prior to the meeting Gildan expressed strong opposition to key 
remedial actions in the areas of freedom of association and mandatory overtime.  The 
July 12 meeting took place, but there was no discussion of remediation.  Instead, Gildan’s 
CEO announced at this meeting that the company had decided to close the El Progreso 
factory and that it would do so eleven weeks hence.  Gildan claims that the decision to 
close the factory is “absolutely unrelated” to the investigation of worker rights violations 
at the facility and to workers’ efforts to unionize. 
 
 
The Implications of Plant Closure 
 
Gildan Activewear’s decision to close the El Progreso factory in the midst of the 
remediation process renders the discussion of many remedial actions pointless in terms of 
their potential value to the factory’s employees.  The purpose of code of conduct 
enforcement is to eliminate worker rights violations and improve respect for worker 
rights – and, in so doing, improve workers’ lives.  If Gildan proceeds with its plans to 
close the factory in September, then any remedial action taken between now and the date 
of closure will be of only marginal value to workers.  (The primary exceptions are back 
pay and other compensation for dismissed workers and back pay for current workers; 
these issues are discussed later in this report.)  To the extent that particular remedial 
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actions at this stage are of any value at all, Gildan is obligated to proceed with haste to 
implement them, and we have noted in this report those recommendations with which we 
believe the factory should go forward.   
 
The decision to close the facility is itself of great concern from a code of conduct 
standpoint.  Factory closures are common in the garment industry.  Regrettable as 
closures may be, university codes of conduct do not inhibit the numerous closures that 
occur in the normal course of business.  However, there are some circumstances where 
closure is not appropriate and does violate university codes – specifically, where the 
decision to close is motivated by anti-union animus, or some other form of 
discrimination, or where the decision is motivated by a desire to avoid code compliance.  
A company may also be acting in conflict with code obligations when a decision to close 
a factory comes subsequent to the identification of serious code violations and before 
those violations have been addressed – unless the company has no viable alternatives to 
closure.    
 
Both categories of concerns arise in the case of Gildan El Progreso.   
 
Evaluating Gildan’s Claim that Closure is Unrelated to Workers’ Efforts to Organize a 
Union 
 
Given the timing of the decision, and given the serious and repeated violations of 
workers’ associational rights that the factory has committed in its efforts to prevent 
unionization, the WRC has an obligation to address the question of whether Gildan’s 
decision to close the El Progreso factory was motivated, in part or in whole, by a anti-
union animus – which Gildan strenuously denies.  Proving such motive is notoriously 
difficult in the context of labor law and code of conduct enforcement.  Since Gildan did 
not announce the closure until July 12, two weeks prior to the release of this report, there 
has been very little time to review this issue.  At this stage, a definitive conclusion is not 
possible.  However, the WRC has reviewed the evidence immediately available.  This 
evidence, and its implications, are outlined below. 
 
Both the immediate circumstances of the closure decision, and Gildan’s prior actions, 
suggest that anti-union animus was a motivating factor for the decision to close the 
facility.   
 
As discussed in detail later in this report, the WRC found in its assessment of the El 
Progreso factory that management systematically fired workers over the last two years in 
order to prevent the formation of a union.  The evidence underlying this conclusion is 
overwhelming and the WRC’s findings in this regard are matched by those of the FLA.   
 
Allegations of illegitimate firings in late 2002 were brought to Gildan Activewear’s 
attention in early 2003 by one of Gildan’s major shareholders.  Evidence shows that an 
illegitimate mass firing of union members, in response to workers’ lawful efforts to form 
a union, did take place in late 2002 – in violation of applicable codes of conduct and 
Honduran law.  Gildan executives would have had no difficulty determining at that time 
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that the allegations were valid, assuming they made a serious attempt to evaluate the 
situation at the El Progreso factory.  Nonetheless, Gildan Activewear took no corrective 
action and denied, repeatedly, that anything illegitimate had happened in El Progreso.  In 
late 2003, evidence shows that Gildan El Progreso again fired trade unionists en masse.  
Again, Gildan Activewear denied any wrongdoing and failed to take corrective action.  
The El Progreso factory’s repeated mass firing of trade unionists, and Gildan 
Activewear’s tolerance of this illegal activity, is proof of intense anti-union animus, at 
both the factory and corporate levels. 
 
The central point of contention in the remediation discussions prior to the July 12 closure 
announcement was the WRC’s recommendation – standard in such circumstances – that 
reinstatement be offered to the trade unionists who were unlawfully dismissed.  Gildan 
Activewear strongly resisted this recommendation.  In the weeks prior to July 12, the 
WRC made it clear to Gildan that no monitoring body could view remediation as 
adequate unless Gildan was willing to reinstate the workers in question.  This point was 
conveyed repeatedly and it is reasonable to conclude that Gildan understood that it would 
not be able to achieve its goal of laying the labor rights issue to rest unless it offered 
reinstatement to the dismissed trade unionists.   There is a strong chance that if full 
reinstatement were to be offered, if the plant were to remain open, and if Gildan El 
Progreso refrained from any further coercive action to discourage unionization, that a 
union would be formed.  Gildan was thus aware that reinstatement might well lead to 
unionization of the El Progreso factory.  Gildan’s decision to close the factory came in 
the midst of ongoing efforts by the monitoring groups to secure a commitment from 
Gildan to offer reinstatement.1   
 
It is also important to take into account the fact that Gildan has a record of making public 
statements concerning the El Progreso facility that have proven to be inaccurate – 
specifically, the company’s repeated insistence that the factory had not fired workers in 
retaliation for union organizing.  Gildan’s past practice of denying that anti-union animus 
was a factor in management decisions at El Progreso, when, in fact, such animus was the 
primary basis of those decisions, bears on the credibility of Gildan’s current claim that 
the decision to close the El Progreso facility has nothing to do with the desire to avoid 
unionization or with the investigation of the factory’s labor practices. 
 
The facts outlined above, and the timing of Gildan’s closure decision, constitute a strong 
circumstantial case that a desire to avoid unionization was a significant factor in Gildan 
Activewear’s decision to close the El Progreso facility. 
 
Gildan offers some evidence to the contrary. 
 
Gildan provides an alternative explanation for the decision to close.  Gildan states that the 
factory is being closed because it is uncompetitive, for reasons having to do with the 
multiplicity of product lines it produces, a logistical problem related to a bridge that 
                                                 
1 Subsequent to its decision to close the factory, Gildan has proposed to offer reinstatement to some of the dismissed workers – who would, of course, 
only be in the factory’s employ until the factory closes in September. 
 
 7
provides access to the factory, and labor costs.  Gildan states that the timing of the 
closure decision is coincidental and that economic and operational factors, exclusively, 
underlie its decision.   Some of the claims that Gildan makes concerning the performance 
of the El Progreso facility can be partially confirmed; others cannot.  Those that can be 
confirmed lend some weight to Gildan’ assertion that there are aspects of the El Progreso 
operation that are flawed.  However, Gildan does not provide persuasive evidence of a 
causal link between these flaws and the decision to close the factory.   
 
The labor cost issues are real: the base wage for garment workers in Honduras is roughly 
65 cents an hour; wages are lower in some other countries in the region.  Gildan states 
that the work currently being done in El Progreso will be moved to production facilities 
in Haiti and Nicaragua.  In both of these countries, wages are significantly lower than in 
Honduras.  Thus, Gildan does establish that there are labor cost advantages to shifting 
production to other locales.  Gildan does not, however, establish that El Progreso is 
inefficient relative to other Gildan facilities once all cost factors are taken into 
consideration, or that any relative weakness in efficiency is substantial enough to warrant 
closure.  It is noteworthy that Gildan has previously cited its Honduran operation as the 
key to its low-cost advantage in the apparel marketplace.2  This seems inconsistent with 
the assertion Gildan now makes that production costs in Honduras render the El Progreso 
facility uncompetitive.   
 
Labor cost differentials between countries could account for the decision to close a 
Honduran facility, but it is important to note that they are irrelevant to the question of 
why Gildan has chosen to close the El Progreso facility as opposed to one of its other 
Honduran apparel plants.   
 
The logistical issue raised by Gildan is a genuine problem, but it appears that Gildan has 
exaggerated its magnitude.  The problem involves a bridge, used by workers and trucks to 
gain access to the factory, which is sometimes blocked by protests unrelated to Gildan.  
The company claims that, on average, one to two days of production are lost to this 
problem every month.  However, the WRC asked a radio station in El Progreso which 
regularly reports on blockages of the bridge to review their records and tabulate the 
number of blockages reported in the last year.  According to the station, there were five 
blockages.  Credible worker testimony corroborates this conclusion: workers can recall a 
total of three occasions in 2003 on which the factory was closed for the day due to 
blockage of the bridge.  It is difficult to see how the handful of blockages reported by the 
radio station and by workers could account for the twelve to twenty-four lost days of 
production per year that Gildan cites as a major reason for its decision to close the 
facility.  Even if these sources are underestimating the number of days of closure by half, 
the figures still do not square with Gildan’s claims. 
   
Even if Gildan has exaggerated the impact, the bridge problem is real and constitutes an 
inefficiency specific to the El Progreso facility.  It is reasonable to conclude that this 
could be a contributing factor in the decision to close the factory, though it is not a 
significant enough problem to warrant closure in and of itself.  At the same time, the 
                                                 
2 “Story of Factory Closing Unravels”  Toronto Star July 24, 2004 
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WRC has no basis for comparing the El Progreso facility’s overall mix of strengths and 
weaknesses to that of any of the company’s numerous other facilities, in Honduras and 
elsewhere.  It is possible that one or more of Gildan’s other Honduran facilities also face 
logistical or other problems that reduce efficiency.  Thus, while the bridge issue lends 
some weight to Gildan’s argument, it appears to be a smaller problem than the company 
claims and is, in any case, of limited relevance in the absence of information on other 
Gildan facilities. 
 
Gildan states that the El Progreso factory is less efficient than other facilities because it 
produces three products (t-shirts, tank tops and polo shirts) instead of a single product.  
The WRC has no means to evaluate the validity of this information, since this would 
require access to comprehensive data on Gildan’s overall manufacturing operation.  It is 
not immediately clear why a factory’s ability to produce multiple products, as opposed to 
one, is a weakness as opposed to a strength.  It is also not clear why, if it is a weakness, 
the solution is to close the factory rather than modify it to produce one item.  The 
specificity of this claim, however, does lend it some credence as a potential factor in the 
closure decision. 
 
The WRC also has no basis for assessing the validity of Gildan’s more general claim that 
that the closure of this particular factory simply makes sense in the context of Gildan’s 
overall manufacturing strategy, which, according to the company, involves the 
development of production hubs in a number of countries. 
 
Gildan’s assertions concerning the competitiveness of the El Progreso facility could be 
examined fully, and confirmed or disconfirmed, if Gildan would provide the monitoring 
organizations with access to relevant company records, including production data for 
Gildan’s different manufacturing facilities and financial information.  The WRC 
requested this access and expressed its willingness to sign a confidentiality agreement 
with respect to any proprietary information.  Gildan refused this request.  The company 
has offered instead to make a presentation to the WRC and the FLA concerning the 
reasons for closure; however, such a session would be of limited value because, absent 
access to relevant records, it would not be possible for either monitoring organization to 
confirm the veracity of the information provided. 
 
Considering the evidence available at this juncture, it is clear that Gildan Activewear had 
a strong incentive, based on its intense anti-union animus and the absence of any 
alternative means of preventing unionization, to close the El Progreso factory.  The past 
actions of Gildan and Gildan El Progreso have shown that Gildan is willing to use 
illegitimate means to avoid unionization.  At the same time, Gildan cites some flaws of 
the El Progreso facility which could constitute at least a partial economic rationale for 
closure.  Gildan’s evidence is weakened by the company’s failure to establish a clear 
causal link between the issues it cites and the actual closure decision, by Gildan’s 
overstatement of the significance of the bridge problem, and by the company’s 
unwillingness to provide the access to company records necessary to confirm or 
disconfirm several of Gildan’s economic claims.  The degree of credence due Gildan’s 
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explanations about closure is further reduced by Gildan’s record of making erroneous 
statements about violations of associational rights at El Progreso. 
 
It is also important to recognize that the presence of economic reasons in the decision-
making process does not prove the absence of reasons related to the company’s anti-
union animus.  It is a violation of university codes to close a factory because of a desire 
to avoid unionization, even if economic factors were also considered and even if these 
factors represent an additional motivation for the closure decision.  Indeed, if Gildan did 
wish to close the factory because of unionization, the company would nonetheless have 
had to weigh economic factors and would have been less likely to proceed if there were a 
strong economic argument against closure.   
 
As stated above, there is insufficient direct evidence to warrant a firm finding as to the 
question of Gildan’s motivation for closing the El Progreso factory.  On balance, 
however, the weight of the evidence argues in favor of the view that anti-union animus 
played at least some significant role in the decision to close this factory at this time, 
possibly accompanied by a determination on Gildan’s part that closure was also a viable 
option from a purely economic standpoint.  If this view is correct, then Gildan’s action 
can be seen, in context, as a final and definitive retaliatory measure against workers at 
Gildan El Progreso for seeking to organize a union and for bringing their concerns about 
labor practices to the attention of monitoring organizations.   
 
This conclusion does not carry the weight of a definitive investigative finding, but 
universities may wish to consider this evaluation, and the evidence underlying it, in 
assessing Gildan’s actions in light of university codes of conduct. 
 
The Significance of Gildan’s Decision to Close the Factory During Remediation 
Discussions and Prior to Adequate Remediation 
 
Regardless of the motivation behind the decision to close the factory, the timing of the 
decision is destructive – both because it eliminates the prospect for meaningful 
remediation on most issues and because it will inevitably have a chilling effect on the 
free exercise of associational rights by workers throughout Gildan’s Honduran 
operations.  However Gildan’s decision is viewed by outside observers, most workers 
will view it as an object lesson in what happens to Gildan employees when they try to 
organize or when they lodge a complaint about working conditions with an external body. 
 
There can of course be no blanket prohibition on closing a factory during remediation.  
There are cases where a company, due to financial, economic or other contingencies, 
must take the drastic action of closing a factory, without delay and regardless of any other 
considerations.  However, it is widely agreed that meaningful code compliance depends 
on the commitment of licensees and suppliers, where violations are uncovered, to enter 
into remediation and see that remediation through.   
 
The question is whether a commitment to see remediation through carries with it the 
obligation to make a good faith effort to avoid closing a factory in the midst of the 
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remediation process.  In situations where a financial or economic crisis forces closure, it 
is clear that there can be no such expectation.  It is also clear, as discussed above, that if a 
desire to avoid code compliance or to prevent workers from exercising their rights is a 
motivating factor in a closure decision, that this decision is in conflict with code 
obligations.   
 
This leaves the question of what should happen where there is no economic or financial 
emergency necessitating closure, but where, in the midst of remediation, the company 
decides that it wishes to close the factory for reasons of business strategy.  This is an 
unsettled issue of code enforcement.  However, a strong case can be made that where 
viable alternatives exist, a choice to close a factory where violations have occurred and 
where remediation has not yet been substantially completed, is inconsistent with code 
obligations.  
 
The case is identical to that which has led to a consensus that licensees must not cut and 
run from a factory where code of conduct violations have been identified, but instead 
must stay and work to fix the problem.  There is debate as to whether a licensee has any 
obligation to stay at a factory after substantial remediation has occurred.  There is also 
debate about whether a buyer that leaves a factory just before long-standing violations are 
identified retains any obligation to act.  However, there is broad agreement that when a 
buyer is using a factory, and serious code violations are exposed, the buyer has an 
obligation to remain involved until substantial remediation has occurred – even if, for 
wholly unrelated reasons, the licensee would prefer to leave at that point and switch to a 
different supplier.  There are exceptions, of course: unavoidable financial contingencies 
that force a cancellation of orders or a factory that refuses to remediate, despite the 
buyer’s best efforts.  However, the basic principle that licensees should not cut and run 
during the heart of the remediation process is one that has been embraced by the great 
majority of stakeholders involved in code of conduct work – including many in the 
apparel industry itself. 
 
If everyday business reasons cannot be used by a buyer to justify dumping a factory 
where rights violations have just been exposed, then logic and consistency would dictate 
that this same standard should apply to factory owners. 
 
By this standard, Gildan is clearly acting in an inappropriate manner – entirely apart from 
the question of whether anti-union animus motivated the closure decision.  Gildan has 
made no claim to the effect that its closure decision is one of economic necessity.  
Indeed, Gildan has presented its decision as the kind of choice it makes on a regular 
basis, consistent with its stated practice of constantly re-evaluating its operations.  If an 
everyday business preference is not a legitimate reason for cutting and running from a 
factory where violations have been uncovered but have not been remediated, then 
Gildan’s decision to close its El Progreso factory can rightly be viewed as a violation of 







The remainder of this report reviews the WRC’s findings and recommendations with 




Sources of Evidence 
 
During the course of this investigation, the WRC Assessment Team gathered evidence 
from the following sources: 
• In-depth interviews with 37 former and current Gildan Activewear El Progreso 
workers, conducted primarily in workers’ homes.  These included: 
⇒ Individual interviews with 27 past and present Gildan Activewear El Progreso 
workers, conducted in workers’ homes. The interviews lasted on average one 
hour. 
⇒ One group interview with 14 current and 1 former worker from Gildan 
Activewear El Progreso, lasting four hours.3 
⇒ Individual interviews with 7 former and current Gildan Activewear El 
Progreso workers focusing specifically on the issue of sexual harassment and 
women’s rights.  These interviews were carried out by a Honduran specialist 
in women’s sexual and reproductive rights. 
• A meeting with the Country Director of Gildan Activewear, Honduras.  
• A meeting with the Operations Manager of the Honduran Maquila Association 
(AHM). 
• Interviews with the Director of the Regional Delegation of the Honduran Labor 
Ministry for the Sula Valley and a Labor Ministry employee from the region’s 
Program for Women Workers. 
• Meetings with several local human rights organizations with expertise in labor 
issues. 
• Consultation with a local independent monitoring organization for the Maquila 
sector. 
• Consultation with three Honduran lawyers with expertise in labor and human 
rights law. 
• Analysis and review of individual work contracts, pay-slips, Ministry of Labor 
records, and corporate records of Gildan Activewear and Gildan Activewear El 
Progreso. 
• Analysis and review of domestic law, including the Honduran Constitution, Labor 
Code, Criminal Code, Constitutive Law for Industrial Processing Zones for 
Exports and Free Tourist Zones, and the Law for Equal Opportunities for Women 
(LEOW).   
  
Gildan declined to grant the Assessment Team access to the Gildan Activewear El 
Progreso facility.  Due to the nature of the rights issues under review, and the types of 
evidence relevant to these issues, this denial of access was ultimately only a modest 
                                                 
3 Some workers who were interviewed individually also participated in the group interview. 
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hindrance to the Team’s work.  It did not prevent the team from reaching definitive 
conclusions – corroborated by multiple sources of credible evidence, including internal 
company documents. 
 
Findings and Recommendations 
 
The investigation focused on allegations of labor rights abuse in five areas: Freedom of 
Association, Sexual Abuse, Wages and Working Hours, Women’s Rights, and Verbal 
Harassment and Abuse.  The WRC’s findings in each of these areas, the 
recommendations made to Gildan, and Gildan’s response are outlined below. 
 




The WRC investigated allegations that a large number of employees have been illegally 




The allegations of violations of workers’ associational rights pertain primarily to two 
separate episodes which occurred in November and December of 2002 and October and 
November of 2003, involving the alleged mass firing of workers who supported the 
creation of a union in the factory.  The WRC identified overwhelming evidence 
supporting the conclusion that Gildan Activewear El Progreso management deliberately 
targeted union supporters for dismissal in violation of Honduran laws protecting workers’ 
rights to associate freely and to form unions (Article 128 #14 of Honduran Constitution 
and Article 469 of Honduran Labor Code).  In addition, in the course of these dismissals, 
factory management violated legally mandated procedures for the termination of 
employees.   
 
Illegal Firings in November and December of 2002 
 
The WRC identified the following facts, based upon extensive credible testimony from 
workers and union representatives, and documentary evidence provided by the Honduran 
government and Honduran union officials, regarding the alleged illegal firing of workers 
in November and December of 2002: 
 
• On July 15, 2002, 44 Gildan El Progreso workers signed documents stating their 
intention to establish a factory-level union affiliated with the FITH (Independent 
Federation of Honduran Workers).  The participation of 30 workers is required for the 
creation of a labor union under Honduran law (Article 475 of the Honduran Labor 
Code).  
 
• On November 14, 2002, the union filed a request for certification with the Ministry of 
Labor of Honduras. 
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• On November 24, 2002, Gildan El Progresso dismissed 42 workers – 39 of these 
workers were among the 44 who had signed documents in support of the union.  
Fifteen of the 39 workers subsequently provided written testimony that they believed 
the reason they were dismissed was their support for the union. 
 
These basic facts alone constitute overwhelming proof that the factory illegally 
discriminated against union supporters in terminations carried-out on November 24, 
2002.  Given that 39 of the 42 workers terminated on this day were avowed union 
supporters, that the firings occurred less than two weeks after these workers filed papers 
seeking official certification as a union, and that through these firings the factory 
eliminated virtually every worker who had stated his or her support for the union in 
writing, the conclusion that the dismissals were motivated by anti-union animus is 
unavoidable.  The WRC Assessment Team concluded that the firings constituted illegal 
anti-union discrimination, in violation of Article 128 #14 of the Honduran Constitution 
which protects the rights of workers to associate freely by forming trade unions; 
Conventions 87 and 98 of the International Labor Organization, both ratified by 
Honduras, which prohibit non-union discrimination, including, in particular, acts 
calculated to “cause the dismissal” of workers by reason of union membership; and 
provisions of college and university codes of conduct that specifically prohibit employers 
from retaliating against workers in the exercise of their associational rights.4 
 
Additional evidence suggests the means by which factory managers may have gained 
knowledge about which workers among the workforce were union members.  According 
to substantial credible testimony from workers and community members, prior to the 
mass firings described above, three of the 44 workers who had previously signed 
documents in support of the union resigned from the factory. Two of these three workers 
were union officers, including the president and secretary of the union.  Numerous 
individuals testified that they believe the factory paid these workers upon their 
resignation a substantial amount of money (beyond that which was owed to them in 
accordance with the law concerning severance) in exchange for the names of individuals 
who supported the union. While it may never be possible to know with certainty whether 
or not these individuals identified union supporters to management, this evidence 
suggests one means through which factory managers could have acquired precise 
knowledge about which workers supported the union. 
 
Illegal Firings in October and November of 2003 
 
The second major episode of alleged illegal firings concerns the dismissal of 
approximately 39 workers in late October and early November of 2003.  As in the case of 
the firings that took place in November and December of 2002, the evidence available 
from worker interviews and documents provided by union officials and the Labor 
Ministry constitute an overwhelming case that the firings were related to the exercise of 
associational rights.  
                                                 
4 For example, the WRC Model Code of Conduct states: “No employee shall be subject to harassment, intimidation or retaliation in their efforts to freely 





The Assessment Team identified the following basic facts concerning this episode of 
firings.  
 
• On October 30, 2003, Gildan Activewear El Progreso dismissed two employees who 
were leaders of an effort to establish a union in the factory.  The factory cited low 
production as the cause for these dismissals.   
 
• On November 4, 2003, Gildan Activewear dismissed 37 additional employees. Each 
of these employees was a supporter of the union, according to documents provided by 
FITH.  One of the workers dismissed on this day was six-months pregnant.  In an 
interview with a Labor Ministry subsequent to the terminations, a factory official 
cited low production as the cause for the majority these dismissals.  
 
The WRC is aware that the level of employment in this facility fluctuates throughout the 
year and that reduced production in the winter season may cause the factory to seek to 
lower personnel levels.  However, even accepting the premise that the factory desired to 
lay-off workers at this juncture for reasons pertaining to the production cycle, the 
evidence shows that in choosing whom among the workforce to lay-off, the factory 
selectively targeted union supporters.  As in the episode that occurred the previous year, 
there is not another plausible explanation for why each of the workers laid off at this time 
was a union supporter.  The firings therefore constituted illegal anti-union discrimination 
in violation of Honduran and international law and college and university codes of 
conduct. 
 
The conclusion that the firings were discriminatory is further bolstered by credible 
testimony from numerous workers that factory managers made explicit statements – prior 
to and during the November and December dismissals – conveying a clear factory policy 
that unionization would not be permitted in the factory and that union supporters would 
be removed.  These statements were made both in group meetings which workers were 
required to attend and to individual workers.  This testimony was consistent across a 
range of workers with varying viewpoints regarding unionization.  The testimony was 
also highly specific as to the detail of language used and the identity of the individual 
managers and supervisors making the statements.  Several workers, for example, testified 
independently that one manager in particular, a director of production, called a team of 
workers into an office and explained to the workers that “there could not be a union” and 
threatened that “if there was [a union] we wouldn’t get a job elsewhere.”  Other workers 
testified that, prior to the large-scale terminations, supervisors called them into their 
office and made both threats and offers of bribes to workers to reveal information about 
which workers were supporters of the union.  According to testimony from one worker, a 
manager explained that, “if you do not give me the names of all in the union, you will 
live with the consequences.”  This individual was fired shortly after refusing to provide 
the manager with the names of union supporters.  Numerous workers testified that at the 
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time of their dismissal, supervisors told them explicitly that the reason they were fired 
was that they had been identified as having taken part in union meetings.   
 
It is important to note that many of the workers who were dismissed from the factory at 
this juncture, and in the episode which occurred the previous year, signed documents of 
resignation.  These were signed under threat of termination, rather than voluntarily, as the 
law requires.  Numerous workers testified that they were told that if they did not resign, 
they would be fired anyway, but would receive no severance and would not be able find 
work in other factories in the region (i.e. that they would be blacklisted).  Workers also 
testified that managers required them to sign blank forms and told the workers that 
specific reasons for the resignations, such as a need for study or child care, would be 
added to the documents later.  According to testimony, in some cases workers were told 
that if they signed the documents, their file would not be “spoiled” and they could return 
to the factory at a later date.  Because the signing of resignation forms was forced, these 
documents lend no legitimacy to the firings and do not constitute a legitimate basis for 
denying workers reinstatement or back pay.  
 
In addition to violations of workers’ associational rights, the terminations in October and 
November of 2003 also violated Honduran law concerning proper procedures for 
carrying-out worker dismissals.  Article 113 of the Honduran Labor Code stipulates that 
in cases in which employers wish to cite a just cause for dismissal having to do with a 
worker’s performance or behavior, the employer must provide the employee with 
advanced notice and explanation of the dismissal so that the worker is able to challenge 
the claim of just cause before the Ministry of Labor prior to the dismissal.  In the case of 
the terminations in question, the factory provided workers with no notice and instead 
demanded at the moment workers were notified of their dismissal that they hand in their 
identification cards and leave the premises immediately.  Additionally, Article 125 of the 
Honduran Labor Code requires that, regardless of the cause of a dismissal, the employer 
is obligated to provide the dismissed worker with a written document which states the 
date of the start and end of employment, type of work done, and salary for the last pay 
period.  Upon the worker’s request, the employer must also provide the worker written 
information regarding the worker’s efficiency and behavior and the cause or causes of the 
termination of employment.  Despite these legal obligations, the factory did not provide 
workers with written statements of any kind.  In at least one case, a worker testified that 
she returned to the factory on several occasions in order to acquire this paperwork and 
collect her severance check, but was rebuffed each time and questioned about the 
membership of the union.  Because the factory failed to adhere to these basic 
requirements of Honduran law, the dismissals, in addition to violating workers’ 
associational rights, were illegal on purely procedural grounds. 
 
Recommendations (Please note that all recommendations listed in this report were 
crafted and conveyed to Gildan prior to the announcement of the factory’s closure.  In 
some cases, the recommendations are no longer applicable): 
 
The WRC recommends that the factory take the following remedial steps: 
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• Offer to reinstate with full back pay from the date of dismissal each worker who was 
dismissed during the episodes of illegal firings in both November and December of 
2002 and October and November of 2003.  The WRC understands the logistical 
challenges of reaching workers who left the factory long ago and is prepared to assist 
in this process.   
 
• Make a statement to all of the current employees of the factory, both verbally and in 
writing, that the factory will respect the rights of workers to associate freely, 
including the right to join a union of their choosing, and that no worker will be 
dismissed or otherwise punished for choosing to form, join or support a union.  This 
recommendation also applies to Gildan’s other production facilities in Honduras and 
Mexico. 
 
• Conduct training for all supervisors and administrative staff on freedom of 
association and the obligation of all management, supervisory and administrative 
employees to refrain from any coercive action with respect to workers’ choices about 
union representation.  The WRC is prepared to assist Gildan Activewear in the design 
of this training.  This recommendation also applies to Gildan’s other production 
facilities in Honduras and Mexico. 
 
• Implement mechanisms to ensure that any association, lending program, or joint 
management-worker organization, in place at the plant does not carry out any labor 
relations function (see the response section below).  This recommendation applies 
specifically to ‘solidarista’ style associations5, and is made in the light of the 
following statement from the ILO’s Committee on Freedom of Association in 1990. 
 
since solidarista associations are financed partly by employers, 
are comprised of workers but also of senior staff and personnel 
having the employers’ confidence and are often started up by 
employers, they cannot play the role of independent 
organizations in the collective bargaining process...(this) gives 
rise to problems in the application of Article 2 of Convention 
N°98 which sets out the full independence of workers’ 
organizations in carrying out their activities. 
 
Gildan Activewear Response  
 
Despite findings to the contrary by FLA, WRC and Gildan shareholder investigations 
into the matter, Gildan persists in denying that any violations of worker rights have 
occurred and in referring to a Honduran Labor Ministry investigation into anti-union 
discrimination and unfair dismissal at Gildan Activewear El Progreso which concluded 
that all was well at the facility.6  The Honduran government has a dismal track record of 
labor law enforcement, which is why codes of conduct are necessary in Honduras.  
Exculpation of employers by the Labor Ministry is standard practice, regardless of the 
                                                 
5 Solidarista associations are a paternalistic alternative to independent worker organizations and are commonly in some Central American countries as a 
means to prevent workers from forming a legitimate union. 
6 The WRC Assessment Team collected evidence that on three separate occasions, Labor Ministry inspectors were denied access to payroll records at the 
facility, thus raising the question of Gildan’s unwillingness to cooperate with the local authorities. 
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facts of a case.  The unreliability of the Labor Ministry’s conclusions has been brought to 
Gildan’s attention on multiple occasions.  The tenor of Gildan’s response to the WRC’s 
findings demonstrates an unwillingness to assume responsibility for the illegal firings and 
for management’s anti-union animus at Gildan Activewear El Progreso.  
 
Reinstatement and Back Pay for Unlawfully Fired Trade Unionists 
 
While unwilling, as of the date of this report, to acknowledge that any violations occurred 
at the El Progeso facility, Gildan had agreed, prior to its closure announcement, to accept 
the WRC’s recommendation that factory management conduct a freedom of association 
training for all supervisors.  Through the July 12 meeting, however, Gildan was unwilling 
to agree to offer reinstatement or back pay to the dismissed workers.  The company 
expressed strong opposition to this step. 
 
Subsequent to the July 12 meeting, and after its decision to close the factory in 
September, Gildan proposed several plans for offering reinstatement and back pay to 
some of the dismissed workers.  Leaving aside the limited value to workers of being 
reinstated to a job that will disappear in two months, these proposals fell well short of the 
WRC’s recommendation for full reinstatement and back pay.  The best proposal made by 
Gildan, conveyed to the WRC on July 23, calls for offers of reinstatement only to those 
workers dismissed after October 2003 (thus excluding all of the workers dismissed the 
prior year – 39 workers in total); does not offer full back pay but instead offered back pay 
only for periods during which a given worker can prove that she or he was unemployed; 
provides no back pay to any worker who at this late date is unwilling or unable to return 
to the factory (because she or he is otherwise employed, has moved away, etc.); and 
excludes from reinstatement any worker with any prior disciplinary record, regardless of 
whether the disciplinary infraction in question was serious enough to have warranted 
dismissal.  Gildan, in response to the recommendation of the WRC and the FLA, also 
proposed to provide to the reinstated workers, upon the factory’s closure, the same 
severance package as the rest of the workforce.  However, Gildan stated that for the 
purpose of calculating severance (the amount of severance is a function of the length of a 
worker’s employment) length of employment would be based on the reinstatement date 
rather than the date of hire.  The financial penalty for each worker would be significant.   
 
It is unclear how many workers would be in a position to accept employment at Gildan 
for two months.  Since failing to do so would make workers ineligible for any of the 
proposed benefits, and since the majority of the workers are rendered ineligible a priori 
by Gildan’s arbitrary cut-off date, this proposal would likely be of only modest value to a 
small number of workers.  The WRC has outlined its objections to Gildan.  Gildan has 
indicated an interest in discussing the issue further but has not, to date, improved its 
proposal.  
 
Although reinstatement to a factory that is about to close is not a meaningful benefit for 
the dismissed workers, full back pay, and severance based on the true date of hire, would 
constitute a significant sum of money from the workers’ perspective.  Thus, despite its 
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decision to close the factory, it is important for Gildan to agree to provide full back pay 
and severance to all of the dismissed workers and to implement this plan expeditiously. 
 
Gildan’s refusal to date to offer the dismissed workers a fair package of back pay and 
severance, even after the announcement of the closure of the factory, is a strong 
indication of a lack of commitment to code of conduct compliance. 
 
Freedom of Association Statement to Workers 
 
In a statement posted on its corporate website on July 26, Gildan states that it will  
 
create and distribute to 100% of the workforce, in partnership with a local 
NGO, Centro de Derechos de Mujeres (CDM), an educational brochure 
that explains worker rights and freedom of association, with the primary 
purpose of educating the workforce on the concept of a union: what is a 
union: what is not, what it does, what it is for, how much it costs, etc. 
 
This is a proposal made by Gildan in remediation discussions with the WRC and the FLA 
prior to the decision to close the factory.  While a potentially useful tool for popular 
education, a brochure produced by Gildan and a local NGO, detailing the functions and 
costs of a union, does not replace the need for factory managers and supervisors to 
announce to workers that they will not incur any retaliatory measures as a result of their 
choosing to form or join a union in the future.  This issue is now irrelevant at Gildan El 
Progreso – indeed, statements to workers at El Progreso that management will not 
retaliate against any future efforts by workers at the factory to exercise their associational 
rights would, under the present circumstances, only add insult to injury.  However, 
Gildan has stated that it will undertake this effort at its other Honduran facilities.  It is 
important that this be done properly, particularly because the closure of the El Progreso 
facility will send the opposite message to workers at these other factories: that support for 
unionization results in job loss.  
 
Also, it is important that Gildan play no role in the writing of the proposed pamphlet on 
the nature and purpose of unions.  The NGO mentioned by Gildan is competent to 
prepare such material and it is not appropriate for factory management, or Gildan 
Activewear executives, to determine what their employees will be taught on the subject 
of unions and unionization, given the inherent conflict of interest. 
 
Freedom of Association Training for Managers and Supervisors 
 
In its July 26 statement, Gildan states that 
 
An external group will be selected to provide full training on freedom of 
association and labor rights under Honduran law to all sewing facilities’ 
regional executives, supervisors, and a select group of workers.  Another 
training will be held in Montreal at the corporate head office. 
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Such training will have no impact on workers at El Progreso, but will be constructive at 
Gildan’s other Honduran facilities.  The use of an external group, assuming it is a group 
that is qualified, is the proper way to proceed. The trainings given to management and 
supervisory staff should cover obligations as well as definitions of coercive tactics and 
the consequences that will be faced by management personnel who coerce workers.  The 
WRC does not, however, recommend that Gildan workers participate in these trainings, 




An “Employee Association” was created by management at Gildan Activewear El 
Progreso in April 2004, ostensibly to replace an unpopular scheme (Plan 100) by which 
workers paid an earnings-related fee in order to receive advance payments on their 
eventual severance package.  Gildan executives describe the association as being based 
on the Solidarista model, and state that the association, administered by both workers and 
salaried management personnel, would serve as a vehicle for labor issues to be addressed 
and for workers’ grievances to be resolved.  By incorporating some of the functions of a 
union into an association partly controlled by management, Gildan El Progreso has 
created an organization which will serve to discourage unionization and in so doing is 
violating workers’ associational rights and university codes of conduct.  The issue is no 
longer relevant at Gildan El Progreso, but the WRC is concerned about Gildan’s potential 
use of this mechanism at other production facilities.  The WRC recommends the 
immediate dismantling of all Employee Associations at Gildan facilities in Honduras.  
Any economic benefits of the savings plan incorporated into the association should be 
maintained, but should be administered by management.   Gildan has not responded to 
this recommendation. 
 




The Assessment Team investigated allegations that the factory doctor has sexually 




The WRC recognizes that allegations of sexual abuse are exceptionally serious in terms 
of their potential impact on the parties involved.  Mistreatment of a sexual nature is 
among the most psychologically painful rights abuses employees can experience; some 
victims of such mistreatment would, understandably, rather see the abuse go unpunished 
than have their own experience become publicly known.  And the actions alleged, in 
addition to constituting code of conduct and labor law violations, may also be punishable 
under Honduran criminal law.  The WRC is aware of these implications.  For this reason, 
the Assessment Team’s on-the-ground evidence gathering was extended beyond the 
timeframe initially planned, to allow for additional interviews prior to the formation of 
conclusions, and exceptional care has been taken to assure the confidentiality of 
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witnesses.  It is important to note that the Team’s work was hindered by Gildan’s denial 
of access to the factory, medical records of workers, and to the facility’s medical 
personnel.  However, in spite of these limitations, the Assessment Team gathered 
evidence that constitutes a sufficient basis to conclude that serious code of conduct and 
labor law violations have occurred. 
 
On the basis of highly credible and mutually corroborative testimony from female 
workers, the Assessment Team concluded that the factory doctor has on repeated 
occasions subjected women workers to inappropriate and sexually intrusive contact in the 
course of medical examinations.  The Assessment Team heard testimony from six female 
employees who testified credibly that they had been victims of such treatment.  Each 
female worker cited other female workers who had reported similar experiences during 
examinations by the doctor.  Additional women declined to be interviewed, after arriving 
for an appointment with a female researcher, citing fear of reprisal, shame, and 
humiliation.   
 
Workers’ testimony was detailed and consistent across interviews.  The female workers’ 
testimony demonstrated a pattern of behavior in which the doctor, despite explicit and 
repeated objections from the women he examined, requested that they disrobe and then 
proceeded to touch the women’s genitals, pubic hair, or in one case, the upper thighs.  In 
each case, the women had come to the clinic for reasons having nothing to do with 
gynecological issues, but rather had sought consultation for such problems as burns, 
stomach pain, kidney infections and generalized head and body aches.  The women 
testified that, while examining them, the doctor made lewd facial gestures and comments 
of a sexual nature that the women considered offensive.  In one case, a woman was told 
how she reminded the doctor of a former girlfriend.  The examinations that are at issue 
were conducted by the doctor without the presence of a female nurse, although the 
factory clinic employs such personnel.   
 
With the possible exception of one case in which antibiotics were prescribed, the doctor 
did not prescribe any medication or other treatment having to do with gynecological 
issues in any of these instances.7  A male employee interviewed by the Assessment Team 
with regard to this issue reported that he had never been examined genitally despite 
having consulted with the doctor for a genital complaint.   
 
All but one of the women testified that they have actively avoided the doctor since their 
experience with him and approach the clinic only to request painkillers.     
 
Because the WRC was not granted access to the factory or to interviews with factory 
personnel, it was not possible for the Assessment Team to interview the doctor.  
Nevertheless, according to credible testimony from multiple witnesses, the doctor has 
repeatedly insisted upon lower-body nudity and physical contact with women’s genitals 
and/or pubic area despite their objections, and has done so during examinations 
conducted without the presence of a female nurse.   
 
                                                 
7 Nor, to our knowledge, does the doctor have any specialized gynecological training. 
 21
This constitutes a sufficient basis to conclude that the doctor has engaged in inappropriate 
behavior and has placed the factory in violation of university code of conduct provisions  
regarding sexual harassment and abuse.  The behavior also violates Honduran law: 
Article 60 of the Honduran Law for Equal Opportunities for Women explicitly mandates 
the immediate dismissal of any employee of a company found to have perpetrated an act 
of sexual abuse against another employee.  The same law allows workers who are victims 
of such abuse by employers to immediately leave the place of work and incur no 
responsibility for doing so (i.e. with full entitlement to severance).   
 
The fact that such acts have been carried out toward female but not male employees 
means that, in addition to being inappropriate and abusive, the acts were discriminatory 
as well.  The Law of Equal Opportunities for Women establishes as illegal a wide range 
of forms of discrimination against women, including, in particular, issues related to the 
protection of women’s health (Articles 14 through 21).  The doctor’s behavior has not 
only caused injury to the women who have been impacted directly, through both trauma 
resulting from the experience and the resulting avoidance of medical attention, but the 
behavior has also led to a broader mistrust toward the doctor and the factory’s clinic 
among women workers in the plant.  The behavior has thereby placed at risk the health of 




The WRC recommends the following remedial actions:  
 
• Immediately terminate the factory’s relationship with the current doctor.  Ensure 
that female workers are attended by female medical staff, whenever requested, 
and that all female workers are made aware of this option.  The most efficient way 
to ensure this would be to hire a permanent and full-time female doctor. 
 
• Conduct training for all supervisors and administrative staff on the nature and 
prevention of sexual harassment and abuse.  The WRC is prepared to assist 
Gildan Activewear in the design of this training.   
 
Gildan Activewear Response 
 
Gildan Activewear took allegations of sexual abuse by the doctor at Gildan Activewear 
El Progreso facility seriously from the outset.  Upon hearing of the findings, Gildan took 
steps to ensure that a female nurse would henceforth be present during all examinations.  
They also reprimanded the doctor.  Upon further discussion, Gildan agreed to suspend the 
doctor (with pay), pending further investigation into the allegations.  The WRC 
recommended that Gildan secure the assistance of a local NGO and conduct its own 
discussions with female employees.  Gildan did so, conducting a training on workplace 
sexual harassment and abuse that served as a vehicle for women to bring forth 
information about their own experiences with the doctor.  A number of women, including 
women not interviewed by the WRC, testified at the training to experiencing 
inappropriate contact while being examined.  The information gathered through this 
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process led Gildan to accept the WRC’s recommendation that the doctor be terminated.  
Gildan Activewear’s contract with the doctor was terminated on June 30, 2004. 
 
Gildan has stated that it will revise the examination form used by the factory clinic and 
require that on each form involving a female patient, a nurse sign indicating her presence 
during the examination.  The company states that it will also communicate the nurse-
present policy to employees by posting a sign at the clinic. 
 
It is not clear if the replacement doctor hired by Gildan is male or female. 
 
The sexual harassment seminar of June 22 incorporated women workers as participants.  
While this was a useful activity, it is also necessary that supervisory and management 
personnel are trained separately from workers on the recognition and prevention of 
workplace sexual harassment and abuse.  These trainings should take place immediately 
at Gildan El Progreso, despite the planned closure of the facility, and should also be 
conducted at all other Gildan production facilities. 
 
The WRC supports Gildan’s offer of counseling for all women affected by the actions of 
the terminated doctor, and will appreciate the opportunity to verify implementation. 
 
Despite the progress made in this area, the WRC remains concerned that Gildan 
continues to refer to the sexual abuse, inaccurately, as having consisted of ‘an isolated 
incident’.  It is also regrettable that access to improved in-factory medical care for female 
employees will be terminated when the factory closes in September.   
 




The WRC investigated allegations that workers in this facility are not compensated in 
accordance with the law for breaks; that overtime and work on rest days and holidays is 
not compensated in accordance with the law; and that mandatory work shifts are longer 
than the legal maximum and that overtime hours worked during these shifts are 




The WRC found that Gildan Activewear El Progreso has violated Honduran law through 
the following illegal scheduling and compensation practices.   
 
• Uncompensated Break Time: Article 323 of the Honduran Labor Code defines 
effective (e.g. compensatable) work time as that in which workers are either at the 
disposal of their employers or when they cannot leave the worksite during rest and 
meal times.  Article 326 of the Labor Code specifies that in all cases in which 
workers work a continuous normal work schedule, workers are entitled to a break of 
30 minutes during their shift, and that this 30-minute period is to be calculated as 
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effective work time.  Numerous workers testified and the WRC observed directly that  
workers generally do not leave the factory compound during their lunch break, due to 
a variety of factors including lack of transportation and distance to their homes.  As 
the WRC has confirmed through a review of workers’ pay slips, workers are not paid 
for their lunch breaks.  Because workers cannot reasonably leave the worksite for this 
lunch break period and because workers’ shifts are continuous as defined in Article 
326 of the Labor Code, the facility’s failure to pay workers for lunch breaks is a 
violation of Honduran law.  
 
• Forced and Improperly Compensated Work on Official Holidays: Article 339 of the 
Honduran Labor Code and Article 128 #9 of the Honduran Constitution stipulate that 
all employees have a right to certain paid statutory holidays, including January 1, 
April 14, May 1, September 15, October 3, October 12, October 21, December 25, 
and the Thursday, Friday and Saturday of Easter week.  Honduran law also requires 
that, if an employee accepts an offer to work on a statutory holiday, the employee is 
to be compensated at a rate of double that which he or she would typically be paid 
and the employee is to be provided with an additional day of rest.  Numerous workers 
testified and the WRC verified through a review of workers’ pay slips that workers 
are routinely required to work on statutory holidays and that they are compensated for 
this work at a normal wage rate, rather than at the legally mandated holiday wage. 
The requirement of employees to work on official holidays and the non-payment of 
holiday wages are violations of Honduran law. 
 
• Forced and Improperly Compensated Work on Official Rest Days: Article 344 of the 
Honduran Labor Code stipulates that commercial and industrial establishments are to 
remain closed on Sundays.  This requirement is consistent with the Honduran 
government’s official designation of Sunday as a rest day and the Labor Code’s 
requirement that employees be provided with at least one day of rest per week, 
“preferably Sunday” (Article 338).  The law does provide for certain exceptions 
relating specifically to businesses for which there is a particular need to remain open 
on Sundays.  Manufacturing industries, such as apparel production, do not fall within 
the specific areas of exception set forth in the law.  Gildan Activewear El Progreso, 
through its practice of the 4x4 shift system, remains in production each Sunday. 
Because work on Sundays is mandatory, rather than voluntary as the law requires, 
and because workers are compensated for this work at the standard wage, rather than 
the double salary rate required by law, the factory’s shift policy violates the Honduran 
Labor Code. 
 
• Forced and Improperly Compensated Overtime as Part of Standard Daily Shifts  
Articles 322 and 300 of the Honduran Labor Code and Article 128 No. 1 of the 
Honduran Constitution stipulate that the normal working day cannot exceed eight 
hours and that all work carried out beyond this limit must be compensated at an 
overtime rate.  The 4x4 system employed by the factory requires workers to work 
daily shifts of 11 hours, from 7:00 a.m. until 6:30 p.m. (including a 30 minute break).  
The shift thus lasts three hours longer than the standard workday of eight hours.  As 
the factory has acknowledged, workers are paid at the same wage rate for all 11 hours 
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of work.  This shift structure is uniformly required of all employees as a condition of 
employment.  Numerous workers testified that managers have responded to their 
requests to not work evening hours (for such purposes as attending school) by stating 
that these hours are required of all employees, without exception, and that if workers 
do not like the arrangement they “can find work elsewhere.”  By requiring employees 
to work shifts that exceed the legally established normal workday and by 
compensating each hour of overtime at a normal wage rate rather than at the legally 
required overtime rate, the factory is violating Honduran law. 
 
Gildan Activewear has stated that the factory has an agreement with the Honduran 
Ministry of Labor that constitutes official government sanction of the use of the 4x4 
scheduling system (i.e. inclusion of a 44 hour workweek in a four day period) and, 
therefore, provides an exemption from those labor laws that this scheduling system 
violates.  The WRC Assessment Team concluded, however, that any such agreement is 
invalid under Honduran law.  Honduran law is unmistakably clear that the nation’s 
foundational legal documents in the area of labor rights – the Constitution and the Labor 
Code of Honduras – supercede any other laws or agreements, and that no law or 
agreement will be considered legitimate if it diminishes in any way the rights afforded to 
workers by these foundational documents.  Article 3 of the Labor Code reads in full8: 
 
All acts or stipulations that imply the renouncing, diminishment, or distortion 
of the rights of the Constitution, the present Labor Code, their regulations or 
other labor laws or provision of social benefits to workers, even if they are 
expressed in a labor contract or any other contract, are to be considered null 
and void (WRC translation from the original Spanish). 
 
Notwithstanding the Honduran government’s authority to enforce labor law, it is the 
monitoring organization’s obligation to identify any instances in which a failure by the 
government to enforce a provision of the law results in the denial of the protections of 
that law to workers at a factory.  Under Honduran law, the Ministry of Labor does not 
have the power to grant individual employers permanent exemptions from the laws 
governing hours of work and overtime.  The fact that the Ministry may have ignored the 
law and made such a grant, does not remove Gildan’s obligation, under college and 
university codes, to obey the law.  Indeed, it is precisely because governments often do 
not effectively enforce their own labor laws and regulations that colleges and universities, 
and many brands and retailers, have adopted codes of conduct.  Under university codes, 
collegiate licensees such as Gildan must comply with the domestic laws of the countries 
in which they operate in whether or not those laws are being enforced meaningfully by 




The WRC recommends that the factory take the following remedial actions:  
 
                                                 
8 The same principle is set forth in Article 128 of the Honduran Constitution.   
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• Immediately begin compensating workers for lunch breaks.  Provide workers with 
back wages owed for at least the past twelve months or since each worker’s start of 
employment, whichever is the shorter time-frame.  
 
• Immediately begin compensating workers at the appropriate overtime rate for all 
hours worked that qualify legally as overtime.  This includes all hours worked in 
excess of eight on a given day, in excess of 44 in a given week, and on any Sunday or 
official holiday.  Provide workers with back wages owed for at least the past twelve 
months or since each worker’s start of employment, whichever is the shorter time-
frame.  
 
• Immediately begin offering workers the option of declining to work on official 
holidays and, for those who choose to work, an additional day of rest in accordance 
with law.   
 
• Immediately begin offering workers the option of declining work on Sundays. 
 
• With respect to the 4x4 shift system, provide workers with the option of working a 
traditional workweek (i.e. eight hour days, Monday through Friday, and a half day on 
Saturday) as an alternative. The WRC recognizes that some workers may prefer the 
4x4 arrangement or, regardless of their preference, have already organized their lives 
around it and are not in a position to switch to a new schedule.  At the same time, 
some workers do not wish to work the 4x4 shift, particularly workers who want to go 
to school at night.  The factory cannot legally require the 4x4 shift because it 
constitutes forced overtime on a daily basis.  Therefore, it must give workers a choice 
between the 4x4 shift and a traditional workweek. Such arrangements have reportedly 
been made in other facilities in Honduras. 
 
Gildan Activewear Response 
 
Gildan remains intransigent on the issue of 4x4 shift arrangements and the worker rights 
that this schedule violates – citing the above-mentioned authorization granted to Gildan 
El Progreso by the Honduran Ministry of Labor.  Gildan Activewear recently provided 
the WRC with a facsimile of the authorizing document, signed in August of 2003.  In the 
agreement, Gildan Activewear El Progreso’s Human Resource Manager states that she 
and 40 named workers are requesting that the 4x4 system be authorized and made legal, 
on the grounds that all workers in the factory prefer it.   
 
As a justification for the 4x4 work schedule, the document has three conclusive defects: 
1) Gildan has not provided evidence of any democratic or widespread consultation with 
workers on 4x4 prior to the August 2003 request for legalization and there was no 
representative body at the time the document was created that could have given consent 
on behalf of the workforce as a whole.  The WRC is aware of a substantial number of 
workers who, contrary to the claim in the document, do not support this system and 
would prefer a standard workweek.  The inclusion of this false claim concerning worker 
consent renders the documents invalid.  2) The 4x4 system had been in place for several 
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years prior to the granting of this authorization.  Since Gildan believes this document is 
the basis of its right to maintain work shifts that are in conflict with Honduran law, the 
company, even by its own standards, was operating unlawfully for several years prior to 
the authorization’s issuance.  3) As noted above, the Labor Ministry does not have the 
authority to issue such a document and cannot unilaterally exempt Gildan El Progreso 
from the labor law.   
 
On the WRC’s specific findings and recommendations, Gildan responded as follows: 
 
Compensation and Back Pay for Lunch Breaks 
 
After some negotiation, Gildan agreed that the factory would begin paying workers for 
their lunch break, as the law requires.  Gildan has not agreed, to date, to provide any back 
pay.  Given that the factory will close in September, the issue of back pay is much more 
important for workers than the issue of the factory’s practices going forward.  The WRC 
urges Gildan to provide back pay in this area as originally recommended.  The WRC also 
recommends that Gildan determine whether similar violations are occurring at its other 
Honduran facilities and that it take corrective action as needed. 
 
All Other Overtime Issues 
 
Gildan rejects the WRC’s findings with respect to all other overtime issues and has stated 
that it will not alter the 4x4 system nor make an alternative system available to those 
workers who object to it.  Gildan has offered no back pay for past overtime work that was 
improperly compensated.  For the remaining weeks of the factory’s life, Gildan intends to 
operate the factory on a schedule that violates worker rights enshrined in Honduran law 
and denies workers income they are legally due. Gildan states that the August 2003 
document gives it the right to do so.  Of greater importance, it is the WRC’s 
understanding that Gildan uses the 4x4 system in the same manner at its other Honduran 
sewing facilities and that it intends to continue this practice. 
 




The WRC investigated a range of allegations that primarily affect women and pregnant 
workers, including: that pregnant workers have been unlawfully terminated, that pregnant 
workers have been denied leave during instances of pregnancy-related medical 
emergency, that female workers are subject to pregnancy testing upon hiring and 




The WRC found that code of conduct and labor law violations have occurred with respect 
to the firing of, and denial of sick leave to, pregnant employees.  The WRC also found, 
on a related issue that arose in the course of the investigation, that the factory is violating 
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laws concerning factory accommodations for workers with children.  The WRC has not 
been able to verify claims that testing for pregnancy and HIV-AIDS is conducted. 
 
Denial of Sick Leave  
 
The Assessment Team heard credible testimony reporting instances in which pregnant 
workers have been refused permission to leave their work stations to seek medical 
attention, including during instances of medical emergency.  Among the incidents to 
which workers testified are the following: 
 
• A six-months pregnant worker was denied medical treatment at the factory’s onsite 
clinic after she began vaginal bleeding, following an accident in which a heavy object 
above her workstation fell on her.  Because the accident occurred on a Sunday, the 
factory’s doctor was not present at this time.  The worker requested to seek 
alternative treatment off-site, but the worker’s supervisor refused her request on the 
grounds a doctor was needed to confirm that a medical emergency was taking place.  
Several hours later, she was allowed to leave the factory. 
 
• A pregnant worker with a serious medical condition was denied attention at the 
factory clinic because, according to management, there was no worker available to 
cover her absence.  
 
Denial of leave to pregnant employees suffering a medical emergency violates provisions 
of college and university codes of conduct requiring that reasonable services and 
accommodation be provided to pregnant workers.   
 
Illegal Firings of Pregnant Workers    
 
The Assessment Team identified two cases in which pregnant workers have been fired by 
the factory in an unlawful manner.  In both cases, the evidence indicates that the workers’ 
pregnancies were known to factory managers prior to their dismissal.  In one of the cases, 
the factory personnel pressured the pregnant worker – in her home, post-dismissal – to 
sign resignation papers.   
  
• The first case involves the firing of a woman three-months into her pregnancy.  The 
worker was summarily dismissed on her first day back at work following three days 
of sick-leave, during which she was incapacitated by the factory doctor due to a 
pregnancy-related infection.  Article 128 of the Honduran Constitution, Articles 124, 
135, 144, 145 of the Labor Code, and Article 51 of the Law for Equal Employment of 
Women explicitly require that any employer seeking to terminate an employment 
relationship with a pregnant employee must obtain prior authorization from a 
competent judge, or municipal mayor, and must provide the worker with prior notice 
of her dismissal.  In this case, the factory neither sought nor obtained authorization 
for the termination and failed to provide the worker with prior notice of her dismissal.  
The firing was therefore illegal.  Moreover, the worker was not told upon her 
dismissal that she had committed any infraction of factory policy, but rather that she 
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was being dismissed in order to relieve her of the strain of performing her job 
assignment, which entailed moving from team to team within the factory. 
Considering this fact and the timing of her termination, the Assessment Team 
concluded that this worker was dismissed as a direct result of her pregnancy. 
 
• The second case involved a female employee who was fired six months into her 
pregnancy.  As is typical in the factory, the worker had informed factory management 
of her pregnancy months prior to her dismissal in order to access medical care.  In 
this case, the worker was involved in an effort to organize a union in the factory and 
was dismissed in the same week that the massive illegal firing of trade unionists was 
occurring (see section concerning freedom of association).  As with the other workers 
dismissed on and around the same day, this worker was told that she was being 
dismissed as a result of a general reduction in personnel, and she was pressured to 
sign a pre-prepared letter of resignation.  When the worker refused to sign the 
resignation form, she was told by management that she was being fired and was given 
a severance package that included maternity pay.  As in the previous case, the factory 
had not sought prior authorization by competent authorities for her termination and 
thereby violated Honduran law.  Several weeks after her dismissal, a woman who 
claimed to be from the Labor Ministry visited the worker in her home and offered to 
pay the worker money in exchange for a formal resignation.  In the last trimester of 
her pregnancy and unemployed, the fired worker conceded to the repeated and 
considerable pressures to “resign” from the factory.  Upon investigation, the 
Assessment Team concluded that the woman who brought the resignation forms was 
not in fact an employee of the Labor Ministry.  The evidence available thus indicates 
that not only did the factory illegally terminate the worker, but sought subsequently to 
conceal the firing’s illegality by obtaining the worker’s resignation through deceitful 
and coercive means. 
 
Mandatory Blood Testing 
 
The Assessment Team heard worker testimony that blood tests are taken and are used to 
test for pregnancy and for HIV-AIDS infection.  Mandatory testing for pregnancy is 
forbidden by Honduran law (Article 46 of the Law for Equal Opportunity for Women), as 
is testing for HIV-AIDS (Special Law for HIV-AIDS, Decree 147-99).  The Assessment 
Team was not been able to confirm these allegations during the investigation and Gildan 
denies that the factory conducts systematic testing of blood or urine   However, the WRC 
has determined that there is a widespread perception among workers in the factory that 
the blood tests are being used for pregnancy and HIV-AIDS screening.  This perception, 
even if it is erroneous, may lead potential job applicants who are pregnant or HIV-
positive to refrain from applying for work due to fear of discrimination. 
 
No Childcare or Nursing Facilities  
 
To ensure that workers are not discriminated against on the basis of their gender roles and 
care-giving responsibilities, Honduran law obligates employers with more than 20 
workers to make safe and secure space available for mothers to feed their children of 3 
 29
years or under (Labor Code, Article 142).  The same law also obliges employers to 
designate an area where children of the same age can be left during working hours under 
the care of a designated person.  In addition, LEOW Article 59 calls for employers of 30 
or more women to provide parentally supported childcare centers for children under 7 
years of age; and Article 140 of the Labor Code requires that a room be designated for 
the nursing of infants. 
 
The Assessment Team found that there is no room set-aside for nursing, and no childcare 
facility at the factory.  Breast-feeding workers are able to leave work one hour earlier 
than the normally scheduled end of production, which partially fulfills the factory’s 
obligation under Article 140 to provide two 30-minute breaks for nursing.  The factory is 
in violation of Article 140’s requirement that their be a room designated for nursing and 
is in violation of LEOW Article 59 and Article 142.  Due to the factory’s failure to fulfill 
its legal obligations in these areas, nursing female workers at the factory tend to leave 
breast-milk at home and parents tend to rely upon female family members or neighbors 




The WRC recommends that the factory take the following remedial actions:  
 
• Instruct all relevant management personnel that pregnant workers reporting 
serious medical problems must be treated in the factory clinic or granted leave to 
seek outside medical attention – without delay. 
 
• Announce to all employees, and include in any worker recruitment materials, a 
statement from factory management that there will be no discrimination against 
pregnant women in the hiring process and no unjustified dismissals or other 
discrimination against pregnant employees.  Instruct all relevant personnel to 
comply with this policy.  The worker mentioned who was fired while six months 
pregnant is entitled to reinstatement to her original position with back pay  
 
• Provide for on-site nursing and childcare facilities, as well as two 30-minute 
breaks, placed at reasonable intervals during the work day, for nursing mothers.  
 
Gildan Activewear Response  
 
Instruction of Management Personnel in the Need for Rapid Medical Attention for 
Pregnant Workers 
 
While denying that the incidents occurred, Gildan agreed that “all relevant management 
personnel will be reminded of the company policy that pregnant workers reporting 
serious medical problems must be treated in the factory clinic or granted leave to seek 
outside medical attention without delay” (Gildan statement of 26 July).  This is a positive 





Discrimination Against Pregnant Workers  
 
Gildan denies that there has been any discrimination against pregnant workers in either 
the hiring or dismissal processes.   Gildan refuses to reinstate the affected workers.  
Gildan has not agreed to have the factory issue a statement to workers as recommended. 
 
On-Site Nursing and Child Care Facilities 
 
In Gildan’s statement of July 26, the company states that “three options are currently 
under study for a childcare facility: either Gildan to subsidize a community group in 
neighboring areas of facilities; Gildan to build a room for childcare in existing facilities 
or Gildan to negotiate the possibility to work in collaboration with the free-trade parks.”  
Given imminent factory closure, however, it seems highly unlikely that any of these 
options will be implemented. 
 
Testing for Pregnancy and HIV-AIDS 
 
Although no violation was identified, the WRC suggested to Gildan, during remediation 
discussions, the factory management could avoid any misperceptions on the part of 
potential job applicants by posting a statement at relevant locations outside the factory 
and/or the free trade zone stating that the factory does not discriminate in hiring based on 
pregnancy or HIV status. 
 
 




The WRC examined allegations that some supervisors at Gildan El Progreso regularly 




Although the WRC heard some credible testimony of abusive behavior by individual 
supervisors, the Assessment Team concluded, based on the balance of worker interviews 
and other data, that this is neither a significant nor systematic problem at Gildan El 
Progreso.
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Appendix:   
 
Members of WRC Assessment Team for Gildan Activewear El Progreso 
 
Licenciada Jessica Mariela Sánchez.  Independent consultant in women’s rights.  Lcda. 
Sánchez has implemented investigative work on domestic child labor for the International 
Labor Organization (ILO) in Honduras; contributed to publications on women maquila 
workers in Honduras for the Centro de Estudios de la Mujer – Honduras (CEM-H, 
Women’s Studies Center – Honduras); and holds a post-graduate diploma in Gender 
Studies from the Universidad Rafael Landívar, Guatemala.  
 
Licenciada María Isabel Escobar.  Regional Coordinator of the Consultorio Jurídico 
Popular (Popular Legal Clinic), San Pedro Sula, Honduras.  Lcda. Escobar is a practicing 
attorney and member of the Colegio de Abogados de Honduras (Honduran Guild of 
Lawyers). 
 
Licenciado Salvador Espinoza.  Independent labor attorney, San Pedro Sula, Honduras.  
Member of the Colegio de Abogados de Honduras (Honduran Guild of Lawyers). 
 
Lorraine Clewer.  Field Director for Latin America and the Caribbean, Worker Rights 
Consortium. 
 
